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FROM WASHINGTON

TO AIG 6006, 6007

NATO CONFIDENTIAL FROM WASHINGTON

POLITICAL ANALYSIS: JAPAN ISSUES SECOND DEFENSE WHITE

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PAPER

1. JAPAN'S SECOND DEFENSE WHITE PAPER--APPROVED BY THE CABINET ON JUNE 4--REFLECTS AN IMPORTANT EVOLUTION IN JAPANESE STRATEGIC THINKING SINCE THE NATION'S FIRST DEFENSE WHITE PAPER WAS ISSUED IN 1970. THE PAPER

(A)--RECOGNIZES THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF DETENTE;

(B)--ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE JAPANESE ECONOMY REMAINS VULNERABLE TO OUTSIDE PRESSURES;

(C)--TAKES ACCOUNT OF CONTINUING TENSIONS IN THE ASIAN REGION; AND

(D)--CALLS FOR INCREASED REALISM IN JAPANESE DEFENSE PLANNING, ESCHEWING THE TENTATIVE EXPLORATION OF HYPOTHETICAL OPTIONS EMBODIED IN ITS 1970 PREDECESSOR AND ACKNOWLEDGING THAT JAPAN'S NEED FOR SECURITY REQUIRES CONTINUING A STEADFAST DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US.

2. SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES: THE NEW WHITE PAPER DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE 1970 WHITE PAPER IN FOUR AREAS:

(A)--IN THE 1970 PAPER, SMALL NUCLEAR ARMS WERE CONSIDERED LEGALLY AND THEORETICALLY PERMISSIBLE, THOUGH CONTRARY TO GOVERNMENT POLICY. IN THE 1976 DOCUMENT, JAPAN AFFIRMS ITS RELIANCE ON US NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND EMPHASIZES ITS THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES--NO PRODUCTION, POSSESSION, OR PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN JAPAN.

(B)--THE 1976 VERSION PLACES MUCH GREATER EMPHASIS ON THE US-JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY (MST). IN 1970 THE TREATY WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AS LONG AS JAPAN WAS NOT A NUCLEAR POWER AND NO MAJOR CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION TOOK PLACE. THE NEW PAPER CONVEYS A SENSE OF LESS QUALIFIED AND MORE PERMANENT SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY.

(C)--THE 1970 VERSION EMPHASIZED "AUTONOMOUS DEFENSE," REFERRING APPROVINGLY TO EUROPEAN NEUTRALS; THE NEW PAPER PLACES UNEQUIVOCAL EMPHASIS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE

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SECURITY.

(D)--THE 1970 PAPER RHETORICALLY MENTIONED THE LARGER ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, SUCH AS THE STRENGTH OF THE ECONOMY AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL STABILITY. THE 1976 VERSION MOVES BEYOND RHETORIC AND ATTACHES BROAD IMPORTANCE TO ACHIEVEMENT OF "OVERALL SECURITY" THROUGH THE PROMOTION OF CLOSE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH JAPAN'S

TRADING PARTNERS.

3. CHANGED FRAMEWORK: THESE DIFFERENCES REFLECT THE RESPONSE OF JAPANESE POLICY PLANNERS TO IMPORTANT CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA OVER THE PAST SIX YEARS. IN 1970 JAPAN WAS RIDING THE CREST OF A POSTWAR ECONOMIC

BOOM. AS A RESULT OF ITS ECONOMIC SUCCESS, FOREIGN POWERS HAD ENCOURAGED IT TO PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. THAT ENCOURAGEMENT, ALONG WITH RESIDUAL NATIONALISM, GAVE THE JAPANESE A GREATER SENSE OF NATIONAL SELF-CONFIDENCE. TOKYO'S FIRST WHITE PAPER DEMONSTRATED INDEPENDENCE IN STRATEGIC THINKING: IT OUTLINED A VARIETY OF OPTIONS, RANGING FROM DISCUSSION OF A MORE AUTONOMOUS DEFENSE ROLE FOR JAPAN UNDER THE US NUCLEAR UMBRELLA TO SPECULATION ABOUT A POSSIBLE FUTURE JAPANESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY.

4. BY 1976, JAPAN HAD EXPERIENCED A SERIES OF UNSETTLING EVENTS. THE 1973 "OIL CRISIS" AND A PROLONGED WORLDWIDE ECONOMIC SLUMP HAD DEMONSTRATED JAPAN'S VULNERABILITY TO FOREIGN ECONOMIC DISRUPTION. ITS TIES WITH THE US HAD SUFFERED SEVERAL "SHOCKS," AND ITS BILATERAL RELATIONS WITHIN THE US-USSR-PRC-JAPAN QUADRILATERAL RELATIONSHIP HAD EXPERIENCED UPS AND DOWNS. THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE TENDED TO SHAKE THE NATIONAL SELF-CONFIDENCE OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT. THE JAPANESE NOW SEEM TO DOUBT THAT THEIR ECONOMIC PROWESS WARRANTS, OR THEIR NATIONAL WILL CAN FORGE, A PLACE FOR JAPAN WITHIN A BIG-POWER "QUADRILATERAL."

5. RENEWED RELIANCE ON US TIES: THE "SHOCKS, OF 1972 AND THE FALL OF VIETNAM IN 1975--WHICH RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT CONFIDENTIAL

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THE FUTURE US ROLE IN ASIA--UPSET JAPANESE POLICYMAKERS. IN THE WAKE OF THESE EVENTS, TOKYO AND WASHINGTON REPEATEDLY REAFFIRMED THE INTEGRITY OF THEIR BILATERAL TIES. IN THE NEW WHITE PAPER, TOKYO HAS RESTATED ITS RELIANCE ON THE US AND THE MST. TOKYO HAS APPARENTLY CONCLUDED THAT ITS EARLIER VISIONS OF A MORE AUTONOMOUS, POSSIBLY NUCLEAR, DEFENSE POSTURE WERE BOTH UNREALISTIC AND PERHAPS POTENTIALLY HARMFUL TO US-JAPAN TIES. REINFORCED BY THE RECENT DIET RATIFICATION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, TOKYO NOW SEEMS WEDDED TO DEPENDENCE ON THE US TO ASSURE ITS BASIC SECURITY.

6. JAPANESE DEFENSE AND A CHANGING WORLD ORDER: IN THE BACKGROUND OF JAPAN'S RENEWED RELIANCE ON THE US ARE TOKYO'S PERCEPTIONS OF ITS LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL

INTERESTS. THE INCREASED EMPHASIS ASSIGNED TO THE CONCEPT OF OVERALL SECURITY--POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY--CONSTITUTES RECOGNITION THAT JAPAN'S LONG-RANGE SECURITY LIES IN THE CREATION OF A HARMONIOUS AND COOPERATIVE INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ORDER IN WHICH FREE TRADE AND ACCESS TO RAW MATERIALS ARE ASSURED. TOKYO APPEARS CONFIDENT

THAT A LOW INTERNATIONAL PROFILE THAT WILL NOT ANTAGONIZE ANY PARTNERS OR RIVALS OR DISTURB ITS STRONG TIES WITH THE US IS AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT.

7. JAPAN'S FIRST DEFENSE WHITE PAPER WAS WIDELY INTERPRETED AS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD "NEW REALISM" ON THE PART OF JAPANESE OFFICIALS AND INTELLECTUALS IN THE LATE 1960'S. THE CURRENT WHITE PAPER, WITH ITS MORE RESTRAINED RHETORIC AND LOWERED EXPECTATIONS, SIGNIFIES A MORE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO STRATEGIC PLANNING SUITED TO THE REALITIES OF THE LATE 1970'S. KISSINGER

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